Sanctions (Diplomatic, Economic, or Military)

Under the UN Charter, States are not allowed to use armed force to settle their disputes. However, States can still resort against each other to lesser form of coercive measure such as diplomatic or economic sanctions. For instance, sanctions have been adopted by the US and Europe against Russia and reciprocally following Russian annexation of Crimea during the war in Ukraine, as well as in 2014, following the alleged poisoning of a former Russian spy in the UK. We can also mention the sanctions program adopted by the United States in 2012 following the death in a Russian prison of lawyer Sergei Magnitsky in 2009, which allows them to sanction members of foreign governments and other individuals accused of human rights violations by freezing their financial assets and banning them from entering the United States. Another example is the economic sanctions imposed in 2021 by the United States against China and Chinese companies accused of participating in the repression of the Uighur minority by benefiting from its forced labor. Both Russia and China have responded to these sanctions by adopting similar sanctions.

States also have the option of submitting their disputes to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or to regional bodies such as the Court of Justice of the European Union. The ICJ rules on the responsibility of states but not on the criminal responsibility of individuals. Its judgments are binding on the states concerned. If a state fails to comply with an ICJ judgment, the only enforcement mechanism available is the adoption of coercive measures by the UN Security Council (Article 94(2) of the UN Charter).

II. Collective sanctions 

Collective sanctions can be decided at the level of international or regional organizations such as the UN, EU and the AU. Chapter 6 of the UN Charter provides for a collective security system that organizes the peaceful settlement of disputes between states. Chapter 7 of the Charter provides for measures applicable in case of “threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.” (arts. 39–51) foresees the possibility of imposing collective sanctions on states or non-State actors.

These measures provide for the possibility of imposing collective sanctions on states or non-state actors. These include diplomatic and economic sanctions such as complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations (art. 41, UN Charter). They also include the use of international military force, necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security when other types of sanction would be or have proven to be inadequate (art. 42, UN Charter). The objective of collective sanctions is to exert pressure on the State or non-State entity concerned to modify its behavior and to reduce threats and breaches to international peace and security.

Sanctions and coercive measures adopted by the UNSC are binding and must be implemented by all UN member States. Before resorting to military sanctions, which are to be used only in exceptional circumstances, the UN Charter sets forth other type of sanction that do not involve armed force. The UNSC can hence adopt mandatory measures to implement economic sanctions that may be selective or limited (for example, arms embargo, freezing of financial assets, travel bans, or imposing various types of embargoes on economic trade).

The implementation of each sanction regime created by resolution of the UNSC is monitored by a sanction committee set up within the UNSC under the number of the relevant resolution.

The UN Security Council has established several sanctions regimes, which in 2024 included : travel bans and asset freezes to sanction over 1000 individuals and entities connected to threat to international peace and security in 15 situations and countries: Afghanistan-Taliban by resolution 2615 (2021) Central African Republic (11 individuals and 2 entities), by resolutions 2127 (2013), 2134 (2014), 2399 (2018)), Democratic Republic of the Congo (36 individuals and 9 entities, by resolution 1533 (2004)), Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (80 individuals and 75 entities, by multiple resolutions including 1718 (2006), 1874 (2009), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013), 2270 (2016), 2321 (2016), 2356 (2017), 2371 (2017), 2375 (2017) and 2397 (2017)), Guinea-Bissau (10 individuals, by resolution 2048 (2012)), Iraq (86 individuals and 61 entities, by resolution 1518 (2003)), Haiti (1 individual by resolution 2653(2022), ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida (262 individuals and 84 entities, by resolution 2368 (2017) and resolution 2253 (2015)), Libya (28 individuals and 2 entities, by resolution 1970 (2011) and resolution 1973 (2011)), Mali (8 individuals, by resolutions 2374 (2017) and 2432 (2018) ), Somalia (15 individuals and 1 entity, by resolution 1844 (last updated on 8 March 2018)), South Sudan (8 individuals, by resolutions 2206 (2015), 2428 (2018) and 2471 (2019)), Sudan (4 individuals, by resolution 1591 (2005)), Taliban (135 individuals and 5 entities, by resolutions 1988 (2011), 2082 (2012), 2160 (2014) and 2255 (2015)) and Yemen (5 individuals, by resolution 2140 (2014)). Regarding Lebanon, the 1636 sanctions regime was set up in 2005 by the UNSC to assist with the continuing investigation of the UN International Independent Investigation Commission in the 14 February 2005 attack that killed the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. It imposed a travel ban and assets freeze on all individuals designated by the Commission or the Government of Lebanon, suspected of involvement, in the terrorist attack. After the mandate of the UN International Independent Investigation Commission ended on 28 February 2009, jurisdiction was transferred to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) (which was created by the UNSC resolution 1757 in 2007). The 1636 sanctions regime currently targets no individual or entity and will remain active until all investigations and judicial procedures have been completed at the STL.

➔ For an update of this list see @ UNSC, consolidated list of sanctions at the end of the text.

III. Humanitarian exemption in UN sanction regimes

In situation of armed conflict, humanitarian relief according to IHL shall always be exempted from restrictions created by economic sanction or a “total embargo” on all forms of economic trade. In order to ensure that international sanction regimes comply with IHL obligations, special provisions have been introduced in certain resolutions to ensure that humanitarian assistance remains excluded from the scope of sanctions. These are referred to as humanitarian exemptions or exceptions.

For instance, the resolution 2593(2021) on sanction regime in Afghanistan, provides that: “all parties [need] to allow full, safe, and unhindered access for the United Nations, its specialized agencies and implementing partners, and all humanitarian actors engaged in humanitarian relief activity, (…) to ensure that humanitarian assistance reaches all those in need”. (our emphasis)

The resolution 2582(2021) on sanction regime in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: “Demands that States ensure that all measures taken by them to implement this resolution comply with their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law, international human rights law and international refugee law, as applicable”. (our emphasis)

The resolution 2590(2021) on sanction regime in Mali stresses that: “measures imposed by this resolution are not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilian population.” (our emphasis)

The need to protect humanitarian activities required by IHL from the negative impact of sanctions regimes has become particularly acute in the case of UN resolutions adopted since 2000 to combat terrorism. In many conflict situations, these sanctions directly threatened humanitarian assistance to populations living in territories controlled by non-State armed groups designated as terrorist. There was a real risk that the presence and activities of humanitarian organizations operating in areas under the control of entities or individuals designated as terrorists by the UN Security Council could be equated with material support for terrorism.

This concern has been raised over the years by humanitarian organisations asking explicit humanitarian exemption language in UNSC resolution.

Starting in 2016, special provisions have been included to limit negative impact on humanitarian assistance. The UN General Assembly resolution 70/291 consistently “Urges states to ensure, in accordance with their obligation under international law and national regulations, and whenever international humanitarian law is applicable, that counter-terrorism legislation and measures do not impede humanitarian and medical activities or engagement with all relevant actors as foreseen by international humanitarian law”

Since 2019, UNSC resolutions have also recognized the existence of this risk and decided to limit it by inserting a specific warning that: " “[…] urges states to take into account the potential effect of counterterrorism measures on exclusively humanitarian activities, including medical activities, that are carried out by impartial humanitarian actors in a manner consistent with international humanitarian law.” (see for example, resolution 2482(2019)).

Progress in that regards started to show in December 2021 when the UNSC included a broad humanitarian exemption in the Afghanistan sanctions regime, covering the provision, payment and processing of funds and assets necessary for humanitarian action and for activities to meet basic human needs. A similar exemption was adopted in October 2022 in the Haiti sanctions regime.

On 9 December 2022, the UNSC adopted resolution 2664(2022) entitled “General issues relating to sanctions” which provides for a global and automatic exemption for humanitarian actors regarding the provision, processing or payment of funds, other financial assets or economic resources or the provision of goods and services to individuals and entities that are listed under UNSC sanctions resolutions. The humanitarian exemption provided by this resolution is applicable to all former and future UNSC sanctions resolutions whenever there might be conflict as to the application of this new global humanitarian exemption. It gives a broad definition of humanitarian activities excluded from the scope of the asset freeze UNSC sanctions measures: “the provision of funds and assets necessary to ensure the timely delivery of humanitarian assistance or to support other activities that supports basic human needs”. It is important that the resolution explicitly extended the application of this humanitarian exemption to the special counterterrorism sanction regime of 1267 (ISIL and Al-Qaida). Although resolution 2664 (2022) stipulates that the humanitarian exemption with regard to special counterterrorism regime 1267 will be applicable for an initial period of two years and that it will either be extended or suppressed regarding these individuals, it provides a basis for stronger humanitarian engagement on this political and legal sensitive topic.

On December 6, 2024, UN Security Council Resolution 2761 unanimously decided to extend indefinitely the exemption provided for in Resolution 2664 (2022) concerning the special regime for countering terrorism, which had been approved for an initial probationary period of two years.

The proper implementation of Resolution 2664 (2022) requires that its provisions be incorporated into the national sanctions’ regulations and legislation of all UN Member States and regional organizations.

As of April 2023, the United States, who was one of the penholders behind resolution 2664(2022), has adopted a series of new exemptions and amendments to its legislations.

At the end of 2023, 27 of the European Union's 39 sanctions regimes included a humanitarian exemption that incorporated the wording of UN Resolution 2664.