The Practical Guide to Humanitarian Law

« Calling things by the wrong name adds to the affliction of the world. » Albert Camus.

International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR)


After the conflicts in Rwanda and in the former Yugoslavia, and in the absence of a permanent international criminal court, the international community chose to establish two ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals to prosecute individuals responsible for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and acts of genocide in these two specific situations. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established in 1993, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in 1994, to investigate and punish the perpetrators of the egregious crimes committed during those conflicts.

The UN Security Council set up both Tribunals through resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Such resolutions are binding on all States, and the Tribunals were established in this manner so as to impose their jurisdiction directly on all States. The other method would have been to adopt a treaty creating such a body, which would have required States’ consent and then ratification. ▸ International ConventionsSecurity Council

Since then, on 17 July 1998, States adopted the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), called the Rome Statute, which entered into force on 1 July 2002. The ICC is responsible for bringing to justice persons accused of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. The ICC’s jurisdiction is subject to certain preconditions, and it operates only when the concerned State or States are unwilling or unable to carry out the necessary investigations and prosecutions. The UN Security Council, however, can impose the ICC’s jurisdiction on a given State by adopting a resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

International Criminal Court

Structure and Organization

The ICTY and ICTR, though independent, have organizational ties that ensure a unity and coherence in their judicial operations and increase the effectiveness of the resources allocated to them. They are made up of the judicial organ, the Office of the Prosecutor, and the administrative organ. Before 2007, the Tribunals shared the prosecutor and appellate judges, but since then, they have separate prosecutors as well as separate trial judges and separate administrative organs and budgets.

The Judicial Organ

The judicial organ has fourteen judges who must be of different nationalities. It was originally created with one Trial Chamber for each Tribunal (three judges each) and a common Appeals Chamber (five judges). However, two new resolutions adopted by the Security Council, aimed at accelerating the pursuit of justice (Resolutions 1165 of 30 April 1998, and 1166 of 13 May 1998), added a Trial Chamber for each Tribunal.

  • The judges are elected by the General Assembly of the UN, which, as is the case with the International Court of Justice and the ICC, must take into account the need for equitable geographic distribution and the representation of the principal legal systems of the world. The judges are elected for four years and can be reelected. They are chosen from a list of twenty-two names selected by the Security Council.
  • The fourteen judges then elect the president of the Tribunal, who also presides directly over the Appeals Chamber, appointing them to the different Chambers. The Trial Chambers, once established, also elect their own presidents. In February 2012, Judge Vagn Joensen from Denmark was elected as the new president of the ICTR; he was reelected in May 2015. The current president of the ICTY is Judge Theodor Meron from the USA, who was appointed on 19 October 2011 and reelected in October 2013.

The Office of the Prosecutor

The Tribunals share the Office of the Prosecutor. The prosecutor is appointed by the Security Council, upon nomination by the Secretary-General of the UN, for a four-year term, renewable once. He or she holds the rank of Assistant Secretary-General. In September 2003, Carla Del Ponte from Switzerland was replaced by Hassan Bubacar Jallow from Gambia as the prosecutor of the ICTR. In 2007, the Security Council decided to renew his mandate for four years, until the completion of the Tribunal’s work. In January 2008, Serge Brammertz from Belgium replaced Carla Del Ponte as the prosecutor of the ICTY; he was reappointed in September 2011. The staff in this office is nominated by the Secretary-General upon recommendation of the prosecutor, who is also assisted by two deputy prosecutors (one for each Tribunal).

The Administrative Organ

The administrative organ is the Registry, run by a registrar. Each Tribunal has its own Registry, responsible for the administration and servicing of the Tribunal. The registrars are nominated to four-year, renewable terms by the Secretary-General of the UN after consultation with the president of the Tribunal. The registrar has a staff that is also nominated by the Secretary-General, after consultation with the registrar.

The 2010–2011 regular budgets of the Tribunals, approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations, amount to $227 million for the ICTR and $302 million for the ICTY, and are to be drawn from the regular budget of the UN. The Tribunals also operate partly thanks to voluntary contributions made by States. This means that they frequently suffer from serious funding problems that hinder their activities. This is especially a problem for the ICTR.

As of February 2011, the ICTR employed 628 staff from seventy-seven nationalities, and the ICTY had 988 staff members from eighty-two countries.

Jurisdiction and Sentencing

Subject Matter Jurisdiction (Jurisdiction Ratione Materiae)

Both Tribunals have the power to “prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law” (Art. 1 of both statutes). The specific crimes over which they have jurisdiction are defined in detail in each of the Statutes (Arts. 2–5 of ICTY Statute; Articles 2–4 of ICTR Statute). These crimes fall under the categories of acts of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, for both Tribunals. Within this framework, each Tribunal has added a specific type of crime to its jurisdiction, in comparison with narrower past interpretations of international law:

  • The ICTY raised the legal status of the crime of rape, as such, to that of a crime against humanity. This is a new judicial specificity. To this effect, the ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence provide measures requiring a lighter burden of proof in cases of sexual assault (Rule 96).
  • The ICTR extended the notion of grave breaches of international humanitarian law to include situations of internal armed conflict. It based accusations on violations of Article 3 of Additional Protocol II of 1977 (Art. 4 of ICTR Statute).

The ICTR has set two very important legal precedents, on rape and genocide, in the judgment rendered against Jean-Paul Akayesu (ICTR-96-4-T, delivered on 2 September 1998). It is the first judgment rendered by an international tribunal that finds an individual guilty of genocide and rape, using legal definitions of rape and genocide, on the one hand, and of serious violations of Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions, on the other.

In addition to the guilty ruling, the ICTR also set an important legal precedent by stating that rape can be an act of genocide. More details concerning the judgment are provided in the entry on ▸ Rape .

Personal Jurisdiction (Jurisdiction Ratione Personae)

The two Statutes are based on the principle of individual criminal responsibility (Art. 7 of ICTY Statute, Art. 6 of ICTR Statute). Under current international law, this principle only applies to “natural persons” (individual human beings), and the statutes insist on the fact that their jurisdiction is only over such persons (Art. 6 of ICTY Statute, Art. 5 of ICTR Statute). States (or private actors), therefore, cannot be judged.

The Tribunals have the power to prosecute any individual accused of serious violations of international humanitarian law (Art. 1 of both Statutes), regardless of their level of responsibility. The Statutes draw from the provisions of the Nuremberg Tribunal.

  • Any person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed, or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation, or execution of a crime under jurisdiction of the Tribunals—whether a government official, military commander, or subordinate—is individually responsible for the crime and may be prosecuted (Art. 7.1 of ICTY Statute; Art. 6.1 of ICTR Statute).
  • Neither the official rank of an accused nor the fact that he or she may have acted under superior orders are grounds for excluding criminal responsibility.

—In the case of persons of superior rank—whether a head of State or government or a high civil servant—their official position neither relieves them of their individual criminal responsibility nor mitigates their punishment (Art. 7.2 of ICTY Statute, Art. 6.2 of ICTR Statute).

—In the case of subordinates, the fact that they were following superior orders does not relieve them of individual criminal responsibility. However, superior orders may be considered a reason to mitigate their punishment, but only in cases in which these orders allowed them no freedom of action or judgment (Art. 7.4 of ICTY Statute, Art. 6.4 of ICTR Statute).

—Furthermore, a superior will be held responsible for a crime committed by a subordinate, if the superior knew or had reasons to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so, and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or punish the perpetrators (Art. 7.3 of ICTY Statute, Art. 6.3 of ICTR Statute). In this respect, the statutes reflect the provisions concerning the duty of commanders from the 1977 Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions (API Art. 87).


In the Boškoski & Tarčulovski Case (19 May 2010, para. 52), the ICTY Appeals Chamber recalled that, pursuant to Article 1 of the Statute, the Tribunal is not limited in its jurisdiction to prosecute persons of a specific level of authority, which means that the subordinate role of an accused is legally irrelevant in determining his individual criminal responsibility.

Territorial and Temporal Jurisdiction (Jurisdiction Ratione Loci and Ratione Temporis)

  • The jurisdiction of the ICTY covers the territory of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Its temporal jurisdiction covers all crimes committed since 1 January 1991—the date that marked the beginning of the hostilities, according to the UN Security Council. The Tribunal’s jurisdiction will end when the ICTY considers that the hostilities have ended.
  • The jurisdiction of the ICTR covers the territory of Rwanda and of its neighboring States, while its temporal jurisdiction covers only a one-year period, from 1 January to 31 December 1994
  • .


In the Bizimungu Case (22 November 2005, paras. 20, 26), the Second Trial Chamber of the ICTR made an extensive interpretation of its jurisdiction ratione temporis , arguing that even if the tribunal’s jurisdiction was limited to crimes committed during 1994 (Art. 1 of its Statute), conspiracy to commit genocide was a crime of a continuing nature, as it is stated in the Nahimana Case (3 December 2003, paras. 100–104, 1044). Therefore, the Court held that evidence of acts occurring prior to 1994 may be used as evidence of crimes committed during the period between 1 January and 31 December 1994.

In the Nahimana et al. Case (28 November 2007, paras. 313, 314), the ICTR Appeals Chamber hold that “it was the intention of the framers of the Statute that the Tribunal should have jurisdiction to convict an accused only where all of the elements required to be shown in order to establish his guilt were present in 1994.” Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber found that in order to convict an individual, it must be proved that the acts or omissions of the accused establishing his responsibility occurred in 1994 and that at the time of such acts or omissions the accused had the requisite intent.


Persons found guilty of grave violations of humanitarian law shall be sentenced to terms of imprisonment. The Tribunals do not apply the death sentence. Since there is no international criminal code, international law has no standard sentence determined for a given crime. The Tribunals are therefore subject to the general scales of prison sentences that exist in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda (Art. 24 of ICTY Statute, Art. 23 of ICTR Statute).

Once a sentence has been pronounced, the term of imprisonment is served in a country designated by the Tribunal from a list of States that have indicated to the UN Security Council their willingness to accept sentenced persons (Art. 27 of ICTY Statute). The ICTR adds the possibility of serving out the sentence in Rwanda (Art. 26 of ICTR Statute).

As of April 2013, the ICTY has almost completed its work, with the arrest of the two last suspects accused by the Tribunal, Ratko Mladić, arrested on 26 May 2011, and Goran Hadžić, arrested on 20 July 2011. In total, the ICTY has issued indictments for 161 persons. Of those 161 proceedings, twenty-five are still ongoing and 136 are concluded. Out of the twenty-five ongoing cases, thirteen are pending appeal and twelve are currently at trial. Out of the 136 accused, eighteen persons have been acquitted, sixty-nine have been sentenced, thirteen cases have been referred to a national jurisdiction (ten to Bosnia and Herzegovina, one to Serbia, and two to Croatia), and thirty-six individuals had their indictments withdrawn or are deceased, which is the case for Slobodan Milošević, who died after his transfer to the Tribunal.

The ICTR, for its part, has issued indictments against ninety-nine individuals. Out of these ninety-nine indicted persons, one individual is awaiting trial, ten cases are in progress, sixty-five are completed (thirty-eight sentenced, nineteen under appeal, and eight acquitted), two individuals have deceased before trial, three cases have been referred to a national jurisdiction (one to Rwanda and two to France), nine indicted have been released (two before trial and seven after completing sentence), and nine remain fugitives.

The ICTY and ICTR have a scope of jurisdiction that is limited in time and space: the jurisdiction of the ICTY covers the territory of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for crimes committed since 1 January 1991, and that of the ICTR concerns the territory of Rwanda and its neighboring states and covers only the time period from 1 January to 31 December 1994.

  • The Tribunals have the authority to judge individuals accused of criminal acts, not States.
  • The Tribunals operate in parallel with national courts but may request that the latter defer certain cases under investigation or prosecution to the Tribunals for judgment.
  • Victims and States may not bring complaints directly before these Tribunals.
  • The prosecutor alone can decide to open an investigation, either on his or her own initiative or based on information received. NGOs, victims, witnesses, intergovernmental organizations, and States may all submit information to the prosecutor.
  • The Tribunals adopted their own definitions of war crimes and crimes against humanity, which merge the definitions from the Statute of the 1945 Nuremberg Military Tribunal and those contained in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their 1977 Additional Protocols.
  • Neither the excuse of the official function of an accused nor that of following superior orders can serve as grounds for excluding individual criminal responsibility.
  • Penalties are limited to prison sentences. The death sentence cannot be imposed.
  • The Tribunals depend on the judicial cooperation of States to ensure their effectiveness, which in turn requires that each State adapt its laws for such cooperation.
  • The Tribunals’ jurisprudence has clarified the interpretation of humanitarian law.

State Cooperation

The existence of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals does not relieve States of their obligation to search for and prosecute the perpetrators of grave violations of humanitarian law, as established in the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The Tribunals can only function properly if the national systems of justice are effective and cooperate with one another in criminal matters.

Even though the Statutes of the Tribunals were adopted through UN Security Council resolutions, which are binding on all States, the judicial cooperation that is necessary between the Tribunals and the national authorities is only possible if each country has adapted its laws to legislate this cooperation.

Relationship between the Tribunals and National Jurisdictions

This relationship is founded on three principles:

Concurrent Jurisdiction

The Tribunals and national courts have concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute persons presumed guilty of serious violations of international humanitarian law (Art. 9.1 of ICTY Statute, Art. 8.1 of ICTR Statute). This is particularly important for victims. As has been explained, only the prosecutor can initiate an investigation or prosecution, and victims cannot claim damages before the Tribunals. Hence, individuals and NGOs can only file complaints or ask for compensation—and victims can only receive reparations for the injuries suffered—before domestic courts. In this respect, national judges play an integral part in the exercise of international jurisdiction.

Primacy of International Tribunals

Although the jurisdiction is concurrent, both Statutes clearly establish that the Tribunals have primacy over national courts (Art. 9.2 of ICTY Statute, Art. 8.2 of ICTR Statute). This means that, at any stage of the judicial proceedings, the International Criminal Tribunals may formally request that national courts defer to the competence of the International Criminal Tribunals. The Rules of Procedure and Evidence set out the details of the deferral procedures.

This principle of primacy is an exception in international law and was not included in the Statute of the International Criminal Court.

c.Ne Bis in Idem

This is a firmly established principle of law, both in general criminal and in international law, according to which one person may not be judged twice for the same crime (also known as protection from double jeopardy). It is one of the main due process guarantees, as provided for in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Art. 14.7 of ICCPR). This fundamental right is reflected in the two Tribunal Statutes (Art. 10 of ICTY Statute, Art. 9 of ICTR Statute).

An individual tried before one of the International Criminal Tribunals thus cannot be tried again before a national court for the same crime. By the same token, the Tribunals may not rule on an act for which a person was already tried by a national court. However, there are exceptions: the Tribunals may subsequently try the person if “the act was characterized as an ordinary crime [in the domestic trial]; or the national court proceedings were not impartial or independent, or were designed to shield the accused from international criminal responsibility; or if the case was not diligently prosecuted” (Art. 10.2 of ICTY Statute, Art. 9.2 of ICTR Statute).

Obligations of State Cooperation and Mutual Judicial Assistance

All States are under the obligation to cooperate with the two Tribunals, at all stages in the process of investigating and prosecuting a person (Art. 29 of ICTY Statute, Art. 28 of ICTR Statute). Such obligations include compliance, “without undue delay,” with requests for assistance in gathering evidence; taking the testimony of witnesses, suspects, and experts; identifying and locating persons; and serving documents. States must also carry out the requests of the trial chambers, such as summonses, subpoenas, arrest warrants, and transfer orders.

To facilitate the transfer of an accused by a State, the Tribunals have set up an arrangement between the Tribunal and the State in question that bypasses the legal impediments that often result from extradition proceedings.

These obligations include the duty to contribute to the budget, to make personnel available, and especially to adopt concrete judicial and legislative measures into domestic laws, so as to be able to implement the provisions in the Statutes of the Tribunals and the resolutions that created them. The goodwill of States is hence a crucial element in ensuring that the Tribunals function smoothly. This is particularly important since the Tribunals, contrary to domestic courts, have no enforcement mechanism to back them up and no concrete provisions to punish a State that fails to cooperate with the Tribunals or does not amend its national legislation to incorporate the obligations derived from the Statutes.

The stabilization force deployed by NATO in the former Yugoslavia (SFOR), for instance, does not have the mandate of a police force responsible for searching for war criminals. Instead, its mandate establishes that the troops may arrest persons indicted for war crimes if they encounter them in the context of their activities. However, several commando operations that were launched for the sole purpose of arresting indicted persons seem to indicate that the interpretation of this mandate remains in flux.

GenocideInternational Criminal CourtJudicial guaranteesMutual assistance in criminal mattersPeacekeepingRapeResponsibilitySecurity Council of the UNUniversal jurisdictionWar crimes/Crimes against humanity

The Tribunals’ Completion Strategy and the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals

The Tribunals’ Completion Strategy

The International Criminal Tribunals do not have a universal jurisdiction, and their mandate is limited in time. In its resolution 1934 of 26 March 2004, the United Nations Security Council called on the Tribunals to take all possible measures to complete their investigations by the end of 2004, to complete all trial activities on first instance by the end of 2008, and to complete all work in 2010, accordingly with their “completion strategy.” As those dates have not been met, the UN Security Council, in its resolution 1966 of 22 December 2010, decided to create the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals in order to allow them to complete their work without being able to open new cases.

The International Residual Mechanisms for Criminal Tribunals

The International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals was established by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1966 (2010) to finish the work begun by the two International Criminal Tribunals. It is subdivided into two branches; the ICTR branch began functioning on 1 July 2012 and the ICTY branch on 1 July 2013. The resolution establishing the Mechanism calls upon the two Tribunals to finish their work by 31 December 2014 and to prepare their closure and transition of cases to the Mechanisms. In March 2012, the UN Security Council appointed Judge Hassan Bubacar Jallow, the current prosecutor of the ICTR, as the prosecutor of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals.

In this Resolution (1966), the UN Security Council decided that:

  • the Mechanism “shall continue the jurisdiction, rights and obligations and essential functions of the ICTY and the ICTR” (Art. 4);
  • the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Mechanism and any amendments shall take effect upon adoption by the judges of the Mechanism (Art. 6);
  • all States shall cooperate fully with the Mechanism and take any measures necessary under their domestic law to implement the provisions of the present resolution and the Statute of the Mechanism (Art. 9); and
  • the Mechanism shall operate for an initial period of four years from the first commencement date, and to review the progress of the work of the Mechanism, including in completing its functions, before the end of this initial period and every two years thereafter, and further decided that the Mechanism shall continue to operate for subsequent periods of two years following each such review, unless the Security Council decides otherwise (Art. 17).

The Statute of the Mechanism is organized and structured on the basis of the two Tribunals’ Statutes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence.

  • Competence of the Mechanism (Art. 1): The Mechanism shall continue the material, territorial, temporal, and personal jurisdiction of the ICTY and the ICTR as set out in Articles 1 to 8 of the ICTY Statute and Articles 1 to 7 of the ICTR Statute, as well as the rights and obligations of the ICTY and the ICTR (para. 1);
  • The Mechanism shall have the power to prosecute, in accordance with the provisions of the present Statute, the persons indicted by the ICTY or the ICTR but shall not have the power to issue any new indictments against persons other than those already covered by this Article (Art. 1, paras. 2-4);
  • Structure and Seats (Art. 3): The Mechanism will comprise one Trial Chamber for each branch and a common Appeals Chamber. The prosecutor will be responsible for both branches (Art. 3);
  • Organization (Art. 4): The Mechanism shall consist of: (a) the Chambers, comprising a Trial Chamber for each branch of the Mechanism and an Appeals Chamber common to both branches of the Mechanism; (b) the prosecutor common to both branches of the Mechanism; and (c) the Registry, common to both branches of the Mechanism, to provide administrative services for the Mechanism, including the Chambers and the prosecutor;
  • Concurrent Jurisdiction (Art. 5); The Mechanism shall have primacy over national courts;
  • Referral of Cases to National Jurisdictions (Art. 6); The Mechanism shall have the power to refer cases involving persons who are not among the most senior leaders suspected of being most responsible for the crimes covered by the Statutes of the ICTR and the ICTR to competent national authorities, that is, the authorities of the country in whose territory the crime was committed, or in which the accused was arrested;
  • Roster of Judges (Art. 8): The Mechanism shall have a roster of twenty-five independent judges, not more than two of whom may be nationals of the same State;
  • Election of Judges (Art. 10): The judges of the Mechanism shall be elected by the General Assembly from a list submitted by the Security Council;
  • The President (Art. 11): After consultation with the president of the Security Council and the judges of the Mechanism, the Secretary-General shall appoint a full-time president from among the judges of the Mechanism.

International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Churchillplein 1

2517JW The Hague, Netherlands

Tel.: (31) 70 416 53 43

Fax: (31) 70 416 53 55

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

PO Box 6016

Arusha, Tanzania

Tel. (in New York): (1) 212 963-2850

Fax (in New York): (1) 212 963-2848

@ International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia:

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: http://

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Beidbeder, Yves. Judging War Criminals: The Politics of International Justice . London: Macmillan, 1999, esp. 146–85.

Boed, Roman. “The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.” In Post Conflict Justice , edited by Cherif Bassiouni, 487–98. Ardsley, NY: Transnational, 2002.

Human Rights Watch. “Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity; A Digest of the Case Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.” 2010.

—— — . “Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity; A Topical Digest of the Case Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.” 2006.

—— — . “Genocide, War Crimes, and Crimes against Humanity: Topical Digests of the Case Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.” 2004.

“International Criminal Tribunals.” International Review of the Red Cross 861 (March 2006): 5–215.

Jones, John R. W. D., and Steven Powles. International Criminal Practice . 3rd ed. Ardsley, NY: Transnational, 2003.

Kerr, Rachel. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: An Exercise in Law, Politics, and Diplomacy . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Morris, Virginia, and Michael P. Scharf. Insider’s Guide to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: A Documentary History and Analysis. Irvington-on-Hudson, NY: Transnational, 1995.

—— —. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda . Irvington-on-Hudson, NY: Transnational, 1998.

Quéguiner, Jean-François. “Ten Years after the Creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia: Evaluation of the Impact of Its Jurisprudence on International Humanitarian Law.” International Review of the Red Cross 850 (June 2003): 271–311.

Wagner, Natalie. “The Development of the Grave Breaches Regime and of Individual Criminal Responsibility by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.” International Review of the Red Cross 850 (June 2003): 351–85.

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